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Introduction
The aim of this article is to analyze the extent to which soft law issued by the
European Union ("EU") Commission is 'hardened' in administrative court proce-
dures at a Member State level, whether national courts recognize the legal effects
of soft law, and whether national courts can properly deal with the coexistence of
* The authors are Andras Kovacs, Tihamer Toth, and Anna Forgacs. The authors would like to
thank to Em6 Vdrnay and Sebastian Ishiguro for their comments.
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soft and hard law.' References to EU soft law instruments at national level are
most common in administrative law cases, especially in cases involving competi-
tion law, regulated markets, environmental law, and consumer protection law.2
Most of our professional experience with EU soft law derives from Hungarian
administrative law jurisprudence, however, we will examine similar cases from
other EU Member States for comparison.
The first part of the study provides a brief overview of the definition, classifi-
cation and legal effect of various EU soft law instruments, while the second part
explores whether formal and informal soft law instruments produce different le-
gal and practical effects through an examination of telecommunication regulatory
cases and experience gained in EU competition law enforcement. We will ob-
serve the extent to which law enforcers and judges can deviate from soft law
norms. These sector specific insights will lead us to conclude that EU soft law is
practically treated as binding law before national administrative courts.
Finally, we suggest that the constitutional problems arising from this hardened
role of EU soft law in national administrative courts could be cured by extending
and improving the preliminary ruling procedure.
1. The Definition and the Legal Nature of Soft Law
1.1. Hard and Soft Law
When law enforcers, especially judges in the courts of EU Member States,
come to decide cases, they are accustomed to considering various legal document
involving: (hard) law, soft law, and sometimes other official policy documents
that do not even reach the level of soft law. Obviously, these documents may
vary in their impact on the decision they make. Whilst trying to avoid the deli-
cate issue of defining hard law, we will focus on the role which soft law plays in
judicial procedures involving the review of administrative decisions at a national
level.
Soft law has its origins in international law, where it can have two meanings.3
On the one hand, in a formalistic way, soft law is not a source of international
law, although regulated individuals follow it as if it was law. On the other hand,
it is acknowledged as a source of law, but without normative content; meaning
that neither rights nor obligations may be conferred by it.4
For the purposes of this paper, we will focus on the distinctive features be-
tween hard and soft law from the perspective of national judicial decisions. In
referring to soft law, we mean non-binding legal norms that usually cannot be
I See OANA A. STEFAN, SoFr LAW IN COURT: COMPETITION LAW, STATE AID AND THE COURT OF
JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 242 (2013), for further research topics and recommendation.
2 See, for example, id. at 162-65, 275-324, these fields of administrative law are largely determined
by EU substantive rules; additionally, in some of these fields, the Commission has strong competences in
law enforcement (e.g. competition law).
3 Laszlo Blutman, In the Trap of a Legal Metaphor: International Soft Law, 59 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
605, 606 (2010) (starting our inquiry with recalling international legal principles is reasonable, since EU
law, although it had evolved into a separate legal order, has its origins in international law).
4 Id.; LORI F. DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 34 (4th ed. 2001).
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enforced through judicial proceedings. This does not mean, however, that they
do not have a role in judicial proceedings.5 This interpretation is also supported
by EU law, since Article 263 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union (TFEU) explicitly excludes non-binding legal acts (recommendations and
opinions) under Article 288 from the scope of the European Court of Justice's
(ECJ) authority.6
1.2. The Formal Classification of EU Soft Law Instruments
1.2.1. Official Soft Laws: Recommendations and Opinions
An obvious method of classifying EU soft law instruments is to inquire
whether the given document was adopted in a form recognized by the TFEU
itself. Accordingly, an act that was not adopted through an officially recognized
procedure cannot become an official source of law.
Article 288 of the TFEU mentions recommendations and opinions as legal acts
of the EU. These are adopted in a regulated procedure by certain institutions
based on the delegation of authority in the TFEU. Their soft law nature derives
from the fact that according to the TFEU, they shall have no binding force. In
this article we will focus on recommendations, as the application of this type of
official soft law is prevalent both in the ECJ's and the national courts' jurispru-
dence. By contrast, opinions possess features of individualized documents relat-
ing to a specific legislative, accession or other decision, thus their legal effect on
third parties is not obvious. 7
1.2.2. Unofficial Soft Laws
The various types of annual reports, published legislative agendas, white
books, green books, or guidelines to the interpretation of hard law provisions,
notices, communications, etc. all constitute documents that are not official legal
acts under the TFEU, yet they may have normative content. Since their creation
is not regulated, their title is somewhat arbitrary, even though EU institutions
5 See infra Section 2.2.2, for example, in competition law procedures soft law documents read in
conjunction with legal principles may even create rights for third parties that courts should protect.
6 See, e.g., Francis Snyder, The Effectiveness of European Community Law: Institutions, Processes,
Tools and Techniques, 56 Moo. L. REV. 19, 32 (1993); Linda Senden, Soft Post-Legislative Rulemaking:
A Time for More Stringent Control, 19 EUR. L. J. 57, 57 (2013) (noting that although soft law has no
legally binding force, it nonetheless may produce practical effects); Christine Chinkin, Normative Devel-
opment in the International Legal System, in COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BIND-
ING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 23, 30 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2003) (arguing as an
element of the definition of soft law that soft laws are based solely upon voluntary adherence, or rely
upon non-juridical means of enforcement); STEFAN, supra note 1, at 242-43.
7 See Commission Opinion on the Application for Accession to the European Union by the Republic
of Croatia, COM (2011) 667 final (Oct. 12, 2011); see also Commission Opinion of 30.9.2011 on the
Requests for the Amendment of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, Presented by
the Court, COM (2011) 596 final (Sep. 30, 2011); Commission Opinion on the Request from the United
Kingdom to Accept Regulation (EC) No. 593/2008 of the European Parliament and the Council of 17
June 2008 on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Rome I), COM (2008) 730 final (Nov. 7,
2008).
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publishing them try to title them to match their content. In the following, we will
refer to these as communications.
Building on Senden's approach," communications may be classified into four
groups based on their legal effect. There are communications that are explicitly
binding and confer rights and obligations, others interpret hard law (interpretative
communications), other documents restrict the discretionary powers of law en-
forcement held by EU or Member State authorities (decisional communication),
and there are some which do not contain any general rule of conduct, thus they
cannot possess any legal force. For the purposes of this article, we will focus on
interpretative and decisional communications.
1.3. Exploring the Legal Nature of Soft Law
1.3.1. Is Soft Law Legitimized by Courts?
The key to understanding the existence and legal impact of soft law lies in the
stance that courts take in relation to soft law as legal instruments. Should courts
disregard them as no-law, simple policy documents issued by over-activist au-
thorities, they would either disappear or become limited in their scope, regulating
only inter-institutional relations within an authority. The ECJ elaborated its
views on the legal effects of soft law in the Grimaldi v. Fonds des Maladies
Professionnelles case.9 The ECJ acknowledged that recommendations are not
intended to produce binding effects even with regards to the person to whom they
are addressed; consequently, they cannot create rights upon which individuals
may rely before national courts.10 However, national courts are bound to take
recommendations into consideration (emphasis added by authors) in order to de-
cide disputes submitted to them, in particular where they cast light on the inter-
pretation of national measures adopted to implement them or where they are
designed to supplement binding community provisions." This still valid defini-
tion of "no binding effect" is regarded as the essence of soft law, under which
"non-binding" means, for a national judge, that the given legal rules are not en-
forceable in the courts. 12 Two possible judicial, constitutional law approaches
could evolve towards soft law, based on this lack of binding effect.
8 Senden, supra note 6, at 57-75; Linda Senden, Soft Lw, Self-Regulation and Co-Regulation in
European Law: Where Do They Meet?, 9.1 ELECTRONIC J. COMP. L. 1, 23-24 (2005); see also VAmay
Em6 & Tiham6r T6th, Kdzleminyek az Uni6s Jogban [Communications in the Law of the EU], 4 ALLAM
tS JOGTUDOMANY [JOURNAL OF THE HUNGARIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES] 417, 417-18 (2009).
9 Case C-322/88, Grimaldi v. Fonds des maladies professionnelles, 1989 E.C.R. 4407 (noting that
although the judgment is about recommendations, the legal literature interprets it generally for the legal
effect of soft law); see also PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE )E BURCA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND MATERIALS
210 (2nd ed. 1998); JOEL RIDEAU, DROIT INSTITUTIONNEL DE L'UNION ET DES COMMUNAUTIES EUROPEEN-
NES 162-66 (La Librairie g6ndrale de droit et de jurisprudence ed., 4th ed. 2002); Joined Cases 253/78 &
1/79-3/79, Procurer de la R6publique v. Giry, 1980 E.C.R. 2329 (noting that, related to comfort letters,
the ECJ had reached a decision even before the Grimaldi case, stating that national courts must take them
into account); Case C-99/79, SA Lancome v. Etos BV, 1980 E.C.R. 2513; see also STEFAN, supra note 1,
at 162.
10 Grimaldi, 1989 E.C.R. ¶ 16
11 Grimaldi, 1989 E.C.R. [ 18.
12 See infra Section 2.2.4, also cannot create obligations, as will be seen later.
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On the one hand, the jurisprudence of the Hungarian Constitutional Court pro-
vides an example of a cautious approach to soft law. In a matter involving circu-
lars and guidelines of various authorities, the Court ruled that the existence of
such documents, which are not regulated as sources of law in the Act on Legisla-
tion, was in violation of the Constitution.' 3 However, the Court did not annul the
documents, even though it made clear that they cannot have any legal effect.
While this interpretation resulted from an overly strict application of the principle
of separation of legislative and executive powers, 14 it paradoxically lead to a
weakening of the separation of these state functions. If these documents are not
public and accessible to the affected individuals,15 then the authority not only
fails to fulfil its duty to provide information, but also creates a situation endan-
gering the rule of law and legal certainty. Legal certainty is increased whenever
the decision-making authority provides information on its decision-making prac-
tice(s) and on the conduct it expects undertakings and other persons to follow.' 6
On the other hand, under the current approach of the ECJ, the phrase "bound
to take into consideration" is in need of some further explanation. It means that
in the course of law enforcement, a recommendation or a communication must be
taken into consideration, regardless of whether the underlying hard law rule man-
dates this or not.17 This legal effect of soft law, probably not limited to formal-
soft laws like recommendations, 1 8 could be described as a vertical indirect effect,
the same as is attributable to directly effective rules in an unimplemented direc-
tive. Individuals may rely on soft law provisions that limit the EU Commission's
discretionary powers, for example, in the context of competition law, where sig-
nificant reductions of fines are afforded to leniency applicants or companies that
prefer to settle their case with the European competition authority. Just as with
13 See, e.g., Alkotminybfr6sig (AB) [Constitutional Court] Mar. 24, 2009, AK, 111.27 35/2009
(Hung.) (finding unconstitutional 8001/2004 IHM guideline on principles that the authority must use
when determining the relevant market and SMP service providers and their obligations/), Alkotminy-
bfr6sig (AB) [Constitutional Court] Mar. 24, 2009, AK, 111.27 35/2009 (Hung.) (discussing the norma-
tive nature of the circular published by National Police Force on how to apply wheel clamps);
Alkotminybfr6sig (AB) [Constitutional Court] Apr. 16, 2007, AK, IV.19 23/2007 (Hung.) (discussing
the guidelines of the National Tax Authority on certain tax reliefs); Alkotminybfr6sgg (AB) [Constitu-
tional Court] October 5, 1993, AK, X.7 52/1993 (Hung.) (discussing generally non-binding norms).
14 This approach is understandable in light of historical experiences in Hungary, as during the com-
munist regime the doctrine of separation of powers was completely ignored.
15 In this context we will not deal with the cases where only references to such documents are prohib-
ited, or where such documents are not accessible event though references can be made to them.
16 Case C-98/78, Racke v. Hauptzollamt Mainz, 1979 E.C.R. 69 (providing an example of the princi-
ple of legitimate expectations in the context of EU law); see also Joined Cases C-205/82 through C-215/
82, Deutsche Milchkontor GmbH v. Germany, 1983 E.C.R. 2633; Case C-24/95, Land Rheinland-Pfalz
v. Alcan Deutschland GmbH, 1997 E.C.R. 1-1607. In the Hungarian context this principle is detailed in
the hard law provisions of the 2004. 6vi CXL. tdrviny a kdzigazgatisi hat6sigi eljdrds ds szolgiltatis
Altalinos szabilyair6l [Act CXL of 2004 on the General Rules of Administrative Proceedings and Ser-
vices] (Hung.).
17 These delegations can be phrased in various ways. The study does not differentiate between 'take
into account' or 'take the utmost account of,' although it may show some distinctions in legal effect
based on hard law. However, this could be the subject of a separate analysis.
18 CRAIG & DE B(RCA, supra note 9, at 210; RIDEAU, supra note 9, at 162-66.
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directives, third parties can rely on these soft rules against the EU authorities, but
not in private (horizontal) disputes.
The ECJ stated that as far as informal soft law acts (communications) are
concerned, an action for annulment is not available in cases where the adopted
legal measure is not intended to have legal effect on third parties. 19 The same
applies to recommendations under Article 263 of the TFEU.20 However, when a
communication is binding or aims to create an obligation not existing in EU hard
law, then, based on a functional approach, it should be the subject of an annul-
ment procedure.2 1 This means that if the wording of the document implies bind-
ing force, then regardless of the form thereof, it can be subject to an action for
annulment available for hard law acts. 22
More than one conclusion can be drawn from this practice. First, no obliga-
tions on third parties should ever be created by soft law. Second, even if a na-
tional judge were to conclude that the soft law at hand included a provision with
such binding effect, the national judge could not disregard this provision as long
as the European Court of Justice has not annulled it. This derives from the logi-
cal necessity that, if a soft law document can be the subject of an action for
annulment, then there must be an implied acknowledgment of its binding effect,
as otherwise an annulment would not be necessary. The same conclusion can be
drawn from a recent preliminary ruling procedure in the field of the regulation of
electronic telecommunications. 2 3
Thus, the question of whether soft laws are enforceable as law by national
courts depends on the effectiveness of the procedure leading to their potential
annulment. The efficiency with which national judges can refer soft law docu-
ments for preliminary rulings challenging their validity or clarifying their inter-
pretation is of crucial importance. This is also true in cases where the binding
soft law norm is not in conflict with any hard law rules.
It is worth noting that in Grimaldi v. Fonds des Maladies Professionnelles, the
ECJ held that a hard law rule may be substituted with a soft law rule. 2 4 Thus it
19 Case C-301/03, Italy v. Comm'n, 2005 E.C.R. 1-10217, 1 19, 24.
20 See GRIMALDI E ASSOCIATI, COMMENTS OF GRIMALDI E ASSOCIATI ON THE DG COMPETITION BEST
PRACTICES FOR ANTITRUST PROCEEDINGS, SUBMISSION OF ECONOMIC EVIDENCE AND GUIDANCE ON THE
ROLE OF THE HEARING OFFICERS 4 (2010), http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2010_best-prac
tices/grimaldi-associatien.pdf.
21 Case C-22/70, Comm'n v. Council, 1971 E.C.R. 263, T 42; Case C-366/88 France v. Comm'n,
1990 E.C.R. 1-03571, ¶ 8; Case C-303/90, France v. Comm'n, 1991 E.C.R. 1-05315, ¶ 24; Case C-325/
91, France v. Comm'n, 1993 E.C.R. 1-03283, IT 14, 22-23, 31 (showing that it also cannot create obliga-
tions, substituting binding rights); Case C-57/95, France v. Comm'n, 1997 E.C.R. 1-01627, T 23 (address-
ing interpretative communications); Case C-27/04, Comm'n v. Council, 2004 E.C.R. 1-06649, T 44; see
also Joined Cases C-189/02 P, C-202/02 P, C205/02 P to C208/02 P & C213/02 P, Dansk Rorindustri v.
Comm'n, 2005 E.C.R. 1-05425.
22 France v. Comm'n, 1991 E.C.R. ¶¶ 25-26.
23 See Case C-28/15, Koninklijke KPN NV v. Autoriteit Consument en Markt (ACM), 2016
ECLI:EU:C:2016:692, 11 39-42, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=1833
66&pagelndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir-&occ=first&part=1&cid=315159. http://curia.europa.eu/
juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=183366&pagelndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=
first&part=1&cid=315159.
24 Case C-322/88, Grimaldi v. Fonds des maladies professionnelles, 1989 E.C.R. 4407, ¶ 19.
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can be concluded that where a soft law creates or clarifies an existing right in
relation to the authority issuing such soft law, the soft law is not in violation of
hard law, whereas any soft law which creates obligations on the part of individu-
als would be unlawful.
1.3.2. To Deviate or Not to Deviate: That is the Question
According to the settled case law of the ECJ, the Commission can be bound by
its published communication or other types of soft law instruments. 2 5 This self-
binding effect is in line with general legal principles of non-discrimination, legal
certainty, and protection of legitimate expectations. Yet, unlike with hard law,
deviation from published soft law is allowed, if it is well reasoned and does not
contradict any of the above mentioned legal principles. 26 This line of reasoning
by the ECJ makes soft law documents binding through general legal principles.
The binding nature of soft law on national authorities is a more delicate ques-
tion. Given the carefully balanced share of sovereign powers between national
and EU institutions, even if legal certainty and the unity of the single market
would demand that national authorities follow the path of the EU Commission, it
is far from obvious that national authorities are bound to do so. Without the,
special legal powers of the Commission, this would not work in practice.
Recommendations issued within the framework of telecommunications regula-
tions aim to bind not only the issuing institution, but also national authorities
applying those regulations. Just as the Commission can deviate from its own soft
laws, national authorities can also deviate from such recommendations if they
have good reasons to do so. 2 7 This rule is also valid when soft law does not
expressly allow for any deviation. 28
EU competition law communications interpreting TFEU Articles 101 and 102
often include a provision along the line that "[a]lthough not binding on them, this
Notice is also intended to give guidance to the courts and competition authorities
25 See Francis Snyder, Soft Law and Institutional Practice in the European Community, in THE CON-
STRUCTION oF EUROPE: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF EMILE NOEL 197, 199-201 (Stephen Martin ed., 1994)
(stating that this is called regulation by publication in the jurisprudence).
26 See Case C-167/04, JCB Servs. v. Comm'n, 2006 E.C.R. 1-08935, ¶ 207 (referring to Joined Cases
C-189/02 P, C-202/02 P, C205/02 P to C208/02 P & C213/02 P, Dansk Rorindustri v. Comm'n 2005
E.C.R. 1-05425); see also Case T-210/01, Gen. Electric v. Comm'n, 2005 E.C.R. 11-05575, ¶ 516 (noting
that it cannot deviate from rules binding itself); Case C-397/03, Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Comm'n,
2006 E.C.R. 1-04429 (analyzing the Lizin cartel case on the conditions of deviation); Case C-l 12/77,
August Topfer & Co. GmbH v. Comm'n, 1978 E.C.R. 1019 (analyzing legitimate expectations); Case T-
15/02, BASF v. Comm'n, 2006 E.C.R. 11-00497; Joined Cases T-71/03, T-74/03, T-87/03, T-91/03,
Tokai Carbon v. Comm'n, 2005 E.C.R. 1-00010; Case T-279/02, Degussa v. Comm'n, 2006 E.C.R. II-
00897; Case T-52/02, Socidtd nouvelle des couleurs zinciques SA v. Comm'n, 2005 E.C.R. 11-05005; see
generally Case C-3/06, Groupe Danone v. Comm'n, 2007 E.C.R. 1-1331 (discussing the conditions of
deviation); STEFAN, supra note 2, at 201-27 (providing a comprehensive analysis, including principles of
non-retroactivity, rights of defense, human rights and transparency, the conflict of which may lead to the
deviation from soft law documents).
27 Case C-207/01, Altair Chimica SpA v. ENEL Distribuzione SpA, 2003 E.C.R. 1-08875.
28 Archer Daniels, 2006 E.C.R. at 4481-83 (analyzing the Lizin cartel case on the conditions of
deviation); Joined Cases C-80/81-83/81 & C-182/82-185/82, Adam v. Comm'n, 1984 E.C.R. 3411, ¶ 22;
Joined Cases C-181/86 to 184/86, Sergio Del Plato v. Comm'n, 1987 E.C.R. 4991, ¶ 10; Case C-171/00
P, Liberos v. Comm'n, 2002 1-00451, ¶ 35; see also STEFAN, supra note 2, at 139.
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of the Member States in their application of Article 101 of the Treaty." 2 9 These
soft law instruments are well-structured, detailed, and lengthy documents 30 that
often rely on the case law of the EU Courts and are subsequently finalised fol-
lowing a public consultation. In practice, it is hard not to take them seriously.
This 'not binding, but guiding' wording of communications can be understood to
reflect a soft binding effect. The Commission finds it important to expressly
mention national law enforcers as targets of the communication and makes it
clear that the Commission is in a position to guide them through the maze of EU
competition rules. Certainly, the Commission cannot avoid mentioning that the
communication is not binding on them, which is nothing new as long as we
understand 'binding' in its traditional hard law sense: an absolute prohibition on
deviation from the rule.3 1 According to our understanding, soft law instruments
have a soft binding effect: law enforcers should do their best to follow them, but
can exceptionally deviate from them as long as such deviation is explained in the
decision and does not infringe general principles of EU law.
Apparently, the ECJ gives a wider margin of appreciation to national courts.
The Court held in Expedia Inc. v. Autoriti de la Concurrence and Others, re-
sponding to the French Court of Cassation, that national authorities are not bound
to apply EU soft law instruments, and they have complete discretion to take the
thresholds mentioned in the de minimis notice into consideration. 32 The Court
rightly referred to the wording of the notice and that it was published not in the
L, but the C series of the Official Journal. However, the Court should have
acknowledged the importance of the general principles of EU law in the same
way as it does for any member of the European Competition Network. Other-
wise the coherent application of EU competition law would be endangered.33
The difference between hard law and soft law becomes evident when either
the issuing authority or a third party contravenes the rules established therein.
Any conduct infringing hard law will be regarded as unlawful behavior with legal
consequences as prescribed by law. On the other hand, soft law cannot formally
29 See, e.g., Communication from the Commission (EC) Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance
Which Do Not Appreciably Restrict Competition Under Article 101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning
of the European Union, 2014 O.J. (C 291) 1, 1-2 (noting generally that the communication is without
prejudice to any interpretation that may be given by the Court of Justice of the European Union).
30 See Commission Notice (EC) Guidelines on the Application of the Specific Rules Set Out in
Articles 169, 170 and 171 of the CMO Regulation for the Olive Oil, Beef and Veal and Arable Crops
Sectors, 2015 O.J. (C 431) 1, for the latest agricultural guidelines, which occupy 37 pages in the Official
Journal.
31 See, e.g., Communication from the Commission (EC) Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance
Which Do Not Appreciably Restrict Competition Under Article 101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning
of the European Union, 2014 O.J. (C 291) 2, 5. ("Although not binding on them, this Notice is also
intended to give guidance to the courts and competition authorities of the Member States in their applica-
tion of Article 101 of the Treaty.")
32 Case C-226/1 1, Expedia Inc. v. Autorit6 de la Concurrence and Others, 2012 E.C.R. 1, ¶¶ 30-31.
33 Id. ¶ 39 (arguing that, although national courts are not obliged to apply soft law, they should
nevertheless consider the Commission's assessment and give reasons for any divergence); see also Oana
A. Stefan, Relying on EU Soft Law Before National Competition Authorities: Hope for the Best, Expect
the Worst, 7 COMPETITION POL'Y INT'i- ANTITRUST CHRONICLE (2013), https://www.competitionpolicy
international.com/relying-on-eu-soft-law-before-national-competition-authorities-hope-for-the-best-ex
pect-the-worst/.
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be infringed. It will be the underlying hard law provision, as interpreted by a
communication, or a general legal principle the infringement of which could be
argued by a plaintiff. The issuing authority can be held liable for not respecting
its own rules, but even this could diverge from its soft law if it gives explanation
to that effect and does not infringe general legal principles, like the protection of
legitimate expectations. Nevertheless, if the national authority always relies on a
soft law rule in its decisions, then undertakings will also be practically bound by
the soft law. Soft law norms can have practical binding force.
2. The Application of EU Soft Law in National Administrative Courts
In this section we will show that theoretical distinctions between hard and soft
laws are not always significant for national judges in the context of the judicial
review of administrative decisions. In fact, both soft and hard EU laws are con-
sidered to be practically binding rules.34 Before looking at our telecommunica-
tions and competition law examples, it should be recognized that soft laws use
various terms to persuade national law enforcers to follow the path laid down by
the EU Commission.
The strongly worded recommendation in the field of telecommunications regu-
lation expects regulators to "take the utmost account of' the soft provisions,
which comes close to a clear obligation, especially if we take into consideration
that the Commission can effectively challenge deviating national decisions. Soft
laws in competition law apply less intrusive language.
2.1. Telecommunications
2.1.1. Regulatory Institutions in Europe
Companies providing telecommunications services are regulated by national
authorities ("NRAs") implementing hard and soft rules with EU origins. To-
gether with the Commission they form the Body of European Regulators for
Electronic Communications ("BEREC").35 This procedural control mechanism
strengthens the application of soft law as a binding rule. It is interesting to note
that, controversially, the stronger obligation ("take the utmost account of") is
linked to the soft law published by BEREC, the institutional status and demo-
34 This conclusion is based on the fact that the Grimaldi case only mandates national courts to take
soft law into account, but the ECJ has not stated that this would be applicable to itself, which is also
connected to the different levels of law enforcement. See Senden, supra note 6, at 361-99 (reaching the
same conclusion based on several judgments of the ECJ). While this conclusion is highly probable, it is
not accepted unequivocally. See, e.g., STEFAN, supra note 1, at 161-65. See STEFAN, supra note 1, at 20-
21 (critiquing Senden's conclusions, and stating that if a recommendation is binding for the courts, it
cannot be soft and binding under Article 263 TFEU); Snyder, supra note 6, at 217. In our study, we aim
to prove this proposition by analyzing not only the term "take into account" but also the logical analysis
of ECJ case law.
35 Commission Regulation 1211/2009 of Dec. 18, 2009, Establishing the Body of European Regula-
tors for Electronic Communications (BEREC) and the Office, 2009 O.J. (L 337) 1, 1 (noting that in order
for the opinions or common positions of BEREC to have legal effect, they require wording different from
a Commission soft law document).
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cratic legitimacy of which is far more disputed than that of the Commission. 36
One might presume that the use of the stricter language is a direct result of the
agency compensating for its secondary legal status, and that agency aims thereby
to emphasize that the soft law published by BEREC should be taken into consid-
eration regardless of its legal status. However, if there is a substantial difference
between these terms used in hard law, then it is a worrying trend that lower
institutional status triggers more stringent obligations.
The similar differences in the wording of hard law delegations would provide
an interesting subject of study, however, they fall outside the scope of the present
paper. One of the reasons for this is that the implementation of the provisions of
the Framework directive into Hungarian law was carried out through a direct
reference. The national law states that the NRA has to take the Commission
recommendations based on Section 1, Article 19 of the Framework directive into
account, while the related guidelines must be taken the utmost account of [Eht.
24.§ (2)], along with the common positions, recommendations and best practices
of BEREC [Eht. 24.§ (3)].37 Such differentiation may be difficult to justify with
the text of the directive. As such, we will presume in the following that the
national judge has to "take these into account," regardless of the specific
wording.
2.1.2. The Scope of Regulation: the Process of Identifying Significant Market
Players
Under the current regulatory framework applicable to the info-communica-
tions markets, 38 the NRAs impose obligations on service providers with signifi-
cant market power ("SMP"), based on the Commission's recommendation 39 for
determining the relevant markets. The rationale for this is that competition is not
effective in circumstances where there is a service provider with significant mar-
ket power, and that ineffective competition ought to be cured by specific obliga-
36 See Anna Forgics, The Regulatory Powers of Agencies in the United States and the European
Union, 3 EUR. NETWORKS L. & REc. Q. 11, 11-24 (2015); Lhszl6 Szegedi, Challenges of Direct Euro-
pean Supervision of Financial Markets, 4 Pun. FiN. Q. 347, 347-57 (2012).
37 2003. 6vi C. tcrvdny az elektronikus hfrkdzl6sr61 (Act C of 2003 on Electronic Communications)
(Hung.) §24 [hereinafter: Eht].
38 The most important directive in the regulatory framework is Directive 2009/140/EC, of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 Amending Directives 2002/21/EC on a Com-
mon Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications Networks and Services, 2002/19/EC on
Access to, and Interconnection of, Electronic Communications Networks and Associated Facilities, and
2002/20/EC on the Authorisation of Electronic Communications Networks and Services, 2009 O.J. (L
337) 37 [hereinafter Framework Directive].
39 Commission Recommendation of Feb. 11, 2003 on Relevant Product and Service Markets Within
the Electronic Communications Sector Susceptible to Ex Ante Regulation in Accordance with Directive
2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Common Regulatory Framework for
Electronic Communication Networks and Services, 2003 O.J. (L 114) 45; Commission Recommendation
of Oct. 9, 2014 on Relevant Product and Service Markets Within the Electronic Communications Sector
Susceptible to Ex Ante Regulation in Accordance with Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council on a Common Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications Networks and
Services, 2014 O.J. (L 295) 79 (has yet to be applied).
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tions determined by the NRA.40 Since this rule was enacted in a directive,
national judges do not apply the directive itself, but rather the national law imple-
ments it.41 The obligation prescribed by the NRAs may involve mandating the
cost orientation of prices under Article 13 of the Access Directive.42 To achieve
this aim, the NRA can determine the cost accounting methodology, and can su-
pervise the cost orientation by using its own cost accounting method. If the NRA
finds that prices are not cost-oriented, it can intervene and change the prices
accordingly. The NRA reviews the SMP classification and the accompanying
obligation every three years. The NRA either adopts a decision addressed to the
SMP service provider, or if the SMP status is no longer justified, terminates the
status and the obligation.4 3 It follows that this "individualized regulation" has a
three-year regulatory cycle, and the legality of each cycle may be reviewed by
national courts separately.44
According to the Framework Directive, NRAs are required to take "the utmost
account" of the recommendation and the guidelines published under the scope of
the directive. 45 If an NRA chooses not to follow a recommendation, it shall
inform the Commission explaining the reasoning for its position. 46 Under the
notification procedure of Article 7, the Commission has a form of veto power, as
regards to the definition of the relevant market. Procedural rules like these,
which confer powers on the Commission, make the application of these origi-
nally soft rules practically mandatory for national authorities.
According to the Commission's recommendation, an NRA is allowed to dero-
gate from the markets listed therein.4 7 In order to do so, they must follow a
certain procedure. The same option is now codified in the mandatory regula-
tion.4 8 The NRA can determine relevant markets in need of regulation beyond
40 It is a so-called asymmetric regulation, under which the SMP company has additional obligations
compared to competitors, in order to counter-balance the distortions of competition caused by the signifi-
cant market power. See Framework Directive, supra note 37, at art. 16 1 4; see also Ralf Dewenter &
Justus Haucap, The Effects of Regulating Mobile Termination Rates for Asymmetric Networks, 20 EUR.
J.L. & EcoN. 185, 186 (2005); Martin Peitz, Asymmetric Access Price Regulation in Telecommunications
Markets, 49 EUR. ECON. REv. 341, 342 (2005).
41 2003. 6vi C. tirv6ny az elektronikus hfrkdzl6sr6l (Act C of 2003 on Electronic Communications)
(Hung.).
42 Directive 2002/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on access
to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities (Access
Directive).
43 Article 7 of the Access Directive and 2003. 6vi C. tbrv6ny az elektronikus hirkdzl6srf (Act C of
2003 on Electronic Communications) (Hung.). §§62-65.
44 2003. 6vi C. tirv6ny az elektronikus hfrkizl6srf (Act C of 2003 on Electronic Communications)
(Hung.). §65.
45 Council Directive 2002/21, arts. 15, 16, 19, 2002 O.J. (L 108) 33, 44-46 (EC).
46 Council Directive 2002/21, art. 19, 2002 O.J. (L 108) 33, 46 (EC).
47 Commission Recommendation of Feb. 11, 2003 on Relevant Product and Service Markets Within
the Electronic Communications Sector Susceptible to Ex Ante Regulation in Accordance with Directive
2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Common Regulatory Framework for
Electronic Communication Networks and Services, 2003 O.J. (L 114) 45, Preamble (19).
48 16/2004 (IV. 24.) (Ministerial Decree No. 16/2004 (IV. 24.) on the Hungarian Information and
Telecommunication Ministry) (Hung.).
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those identified in the annex of the regulation. 4 9 This makes clear that the legal
effects of a non-binding recommendation can be identical to those of hard law
allowing derogation.
This is also in line with our hypothesis that the real difference between hard
and soft laws depends to a greater extent on the content rather than the formali-
ties. The real dividing line is between imperative rules and rules allowing for
derogations. However, we must keep in mind that the above-mentioned authori-
zation of derogation is 'one-sided', in the sense that it only allows the NRA to
derogate from the rules. It is not clear to what extent interested third parties can
make a claim before the authority or a reviewing court in order to challenge a
non-deviation.
As far as administrative courts in Hungary are concerned, they can not only
annul, but also amend the NRA's individual decisions, which can be of practical
significance to ensure the continuity of regulation.5 0 This is, however, a difficult
choice for the judge when he or she intends to make use of the derogation option
expressly provided for in the recommendation. It is not clear whether the court
can itself amend the NRA's decision with the result of derogating from the rec-
ommendation, or whether it should rather annul and remand the decision to the
NRA to provide an opportunity for the Commission to exercise its special control
powers. It is also open to question whether in a new procedure, if the Commis-
sion did not agree with the reasoning of the court, the final decision ought to be
taken by the court or the NRA. It can be argued that the Commission's decision
in individual cases binds national courts, but in this special procedural setting, it
is not clear whether this should be the case. If, nonetheless, the national courts
are thus bound, then the question whether national judicial review procedures are
basically ineffective arises.
It may be noted that the competences of the Commission and the national
courts are clearly concurring, since there are more and more EU law provisions
that give competence to the Commission, or sometimes even to national authori-
ties over national courts. Article 16 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 states
that, "when national courts rule on agreements, decisions or practices under Arti-
cle 81 or Article 82 of the Treaty which are already the subject of a Commission
decision, they cannot make decisions which run counter to the decision adopted
by the Commission. They must also avoid making decisions which would con-
flict with a decision contemplated by the Commission in proceedings it has initi-
ated. To that effect, the national court may assess whether it is necessary to stay
its proceedings." Then, from the EU context, this type of regulation is trans-
ferred into national law, and the national court will be bound by the decision of
the national competition authority (see for example Article 88/B(6a) of the Hun-
garian competition act), which for a national judge would be the same as if the
Commission's decision would bound the ECJ. It is easy to see that this is a chal-
lenge to the rule of law, although a detailed discussion of this issue is beyond the
scope of this paper.
49 ibid. § 2 Section 3.
50 Eht. § 46.
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2.1.3. A Dutch Case Study of the 2009/396/EC Recommendation
In order to demonstrate the practically binding nature of EU recommendations
in an EU Member State, we would like to elaborate first on a Dutch telecommu-
nication case, which reached the ECJ, and then on a recent administrative law
case before the Curia, the Supreme Court in Hungary. Naturally, the scope and
depth of judicial review differs in legal systems, which shall be taken into ac-
count in these case studies as well. Before turning to the particulars of the cases
themselves, the main features of the regulatory framework should be introduced.
The EU Commission's Recommendation on the Regulatory Treatment of
Fixed and Mobile Termination Rates in the EU5 ' established a common approach
for NRAs to set termination rates on fixed and mobile termination markets.
Points 1 and 2 of the recommendation states that "when imposing price control
and cost-accounting obligations in accordance with [the Access Directive] on the
operators designated by National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) as having sig-
nificant market power on the markets for wholesale voice call termination on
individual public telephone networks (. . .) as a result of a market analysis carried
out in accordance with Article 16 of [the Framework Directive], NRAs should set
termination rates based on the costs incurred by an efficient operator. This im-
plies that they would also be symmetric. In doing so, NRAs should proceed in
the way set out below. It is recommended that the evaluation of efficient costs is
based on current cost and the use of a bottom-up modeling approach using long-
run incremental costs (LRIC) as the relevant cost methodology." 52
Judge Heico Kerkmeester analyzed'a recent Dutch case - referred to prelimi-
nary ruling - related to the recommendation.53 The question in that case was
whether the cost-oriented price is required to be achieved through a pure BU-
LRIC model (involving only incremental costs) or a plus BU-LRIC model (also
reflecting a mark-up for non-incremental fixed costs). 54 Only the issue of rea-
sonableness plays a role here, namely the fact that a plus BU-LRIC model is
closer to cost-oriented prices based on the economics literature. Even though the
service providers claimed during the judicial procedure that the recommendation
is in violation of Article 13 of the directive, the judge who referred the case to the
ECJ did not accept this claim and instead only referred the question of whether,
in circumstances where the plus BU-LRIC price is enough to achieve a cost-
oriented price, the pure BU-LRIC method resulting in a lower price is applicable.
51 Commission Recommendation on the Regulatory Treatment of Fixed and Mobile Termination
Rates in the EU (EC) No. 2009/396 of 7 May 2009, 2009 O.J. (L 124) 67.
52 Commission Recommendation on the Regulatory Treatment of Fixed and Mobile Termination
Rates in the EU (EC) No. 2009/396 of 7 May 2009, 2009 O.J. (L 124) 67 and Case C-28/15, Koninklijke
KPN NV v. Autoriteit Consument en Markt (ACM), 2016 ECLI:EU:C:2016:692, 13.
53 See Heico Kerkmeester, The National Judges Position Towards Mobile Termination Rates, http://
ec.europa.eu/information-society/newsroom/cf/dae/document.cfm?docid=8370.
54 The BU-LRIC model at issue is the model of a hypothetical, efficient operator's costs. In a general
economic approach, the cost-oriented price is the equilibrium price on the competitive market at which
the price is equal to the average cost and marginal cost. Of course, this is only a model and a rough
simplification in case of multi-product companies or cost sub-additives.
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In this regard the judge made national law references.55 This case fundamentally
differs from the later Hungarian example, because both models reflected cost
oriented prices, thus compatibility of the recommendation with hard law was not
an issue. 56 The Advocate General's Opinion issued in the case also emphasizes
that the validity of the recommendation was not challenged in the case.5 7
According to the Dutch judicial practice, the reasonableness of a decision is
evaluated based on the technical standards and the principle of the best possible
approximation. So the method applied by the regulator can be held unreasonable,
and thus unlawful if the undertakings concerned can prove the existence of a
better method than the one used by the NRA.
The predecessor of the Dutch NRA ("OPTA") used the plus BU-LRIC model
already in 2005 and adopted a 5.6 cents per minute mobile termination rate,
which was amended to 7 cent per minute in 2007 based on a successful claim by
the service providers.5 8 In 2008, the NRA once more adopted a 7 cents per min-
ute tariff, which was appealed by the operator, UPC.5 As a result, the Trade and
Industrial Appeals Tribunal (CBb) 60 reverted to a 5.6 cents per minute tariff,
stating that this was the only possibility based on a plus BU-LRIC model. Fol-
lowing this, in 2009, the recommendation was adopted promoting the use of the
pure BU-LRIC model, thus in 2010 the NRA determined the tariff at 1.2 cents
per minute. This court overruled this decision in 2011, using the plus BU-LRIC
model and fixing the tariff at 2.4 cents per minute.6 1
Reaching this decision, the court disregarded the recommendation, stating that
it is not binding, without referring the case to a preliminary ruling procedure. 62
Thereafter, the new NRA ("ACM") determined the tariff at 1.019 cents per min-
ute, applying the pure BU-LRIC model based on the recommendation. 6 3 Acting
upon the request of mobile service providers, the Dutch court set 1.861 cents per
minute as a temporary arrangement and in the main procedure the CBb referred
questions for a preliminary ruling to the ECJ. The first referred question related
55 Kerkmeester, supra note 53.
56 See Case C-28/15, Koninkijke KPN NV v. Autoriteit Consument en Markt (ACM), 2016
ECLI:EU:C:2016:692, ¶¶ 27-28, 73, 78 (admitting that more than one cost-orientated models are
feasible).
57 Koninklijke KPN NV, 2016 ECLI:EU:C:2016:310 at 39,65 (emphasizing that if a recommenda-
tion is in violation of hard law, then a national judge could only reach a decision which goes against the
recommendation in circumstances where such recommendation is annulled, thus deviation is not an op-
tion available to a national judge; additionally, it also suggests that this issue could be raised in relation to
this particular recommendation).
58 See Heico Kerkmeester, The National Judges Position Towards Mobile Termination Rates, http://
ec.europa.eu/information society/newsroom/cf/dae/document.cfm?docid=8370.
59 Id.
60 The College van Beroep voor het bedrijfsleven (Trade and Industrial Appeals Tribunal) is a
specialised appeal court for administrative law cases in trade, industry, competition and telecommunica-
tions law. Special Tribunals, DE RECHTSPRAAK, https://www.rechtspraak.nl/English/Judicial-system/
Pages/Special-Tribunals.aspx.
61 See Heico Kerkmeester, The National Judges Position Towards Mobile Termination Rates, http://
ec.europa.eu/information society/newsroom/cf/dae/document.cfm?docid=8370.
62 Id.
63 Id.
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to the deviation options of national courts. 64 The second question sought clarifi-
cation as to the reasons on which a deviation may be justified: whether a devia-
tion from the pure BU-LRIC method is allowed based on the principles of
proportionality, appropriateness, and on its practical effects, in the light of the
policy objectives and regulatory principles laid down in Article 8 of the Frame-
work Directive.
The Advocate General's Opinion acknowledges that a national judge can, after
giving appropriate reasons, deviate from a recommendation, since it is not bind-
ing.6 5 In this respect, the proportionality and reasonableness of the price regula-
tion must be examined, but the judge must be exceptionally cautious and can
only deviate from the recommendation based on serious reasons. This excep-
tional character of a deviation is emphasized several times in the Opinion.66 Ad-
ditionally, the Advocate General's Opinion stated that in the relevant case there
seemed to be no circumstances deriving from either EU or national law that
could justify such a deviation. 6 7 The Opinion suggests that the right to effective
appeal under Article 4 of the Framework Directive is fulfilled if the national
court examines the option of deviation. 6 8 However, the court is not allowed to
substitute the evaluation given by the national authority with its own. Thus:
deviation from the recommendation cannot be a general trend, only an excep-
tional and special instance. The limits of deviation are the requirement of cau-.
tiousness and the requirement of giving serious reasons. These limits run in
parallel with the limited review powers of national judges in administrative cases,
which precludes national judges from overriding administrative decisions within
the margins of discretion, unless they are clearly unreasonable. 6 9 This "weak
judicial control" hardens recommendations and soft law at national level in gen-
eral and makes them practically binding. This is especially true if we consider
how firmly Advocate General Mengozzi argues that there are no special circum-
stances in the Dutch case justifying such a deviation.70
The Court in deciding the Koninklijke KPN NV v. Autoriteit Consument en
Markt (ACM) case mostly accepted the arguments of the Advocate General and
concluded that "a national court may depart from Recommendation 2009/396.
... .) Nevertheless, according to the Court's settled case-law, even if recommen-
64 Koninklijke KPN NV, 2016 ECLI:EU:C:2016:692 at 27 ("Must Article 4(1) of the Framework
Directive, read in conjunction with Articles 8 and 13 of the Access Directive, be interpreted as meaning
that, in principle, in a dispute concerning the lawfulness of a cost-oriented scale of charges imposed by
the national regulatory authority (NRA) in the wholesale call termination market, a national court is
permitted to make a ruling which does not accord with the European Commission Recommendation of 7
May 2009 on the Regulatory Treatment of Fixed and Mobile Termination Rates in the EU (2009/396/
EC), in which pure BULRIC is recommended as the appropriate price regulation measure for call termi-
nation markets, if, in that national court's view, this is required on the basis of the facts in the case
brought before it and/or on the basis of considerations of national or supranational law?").
65 Koninklijke KPN NV, 2016 ECLI:EU:C:2016:310 at 53, 64, 66.
66 Koninklijke KPN NV, 2016 ECLI:EU:C:2016:310 at 53, 64, 66.
67 Id. at 72.
68 Id. at 48.
69 See infra Section 2.2.4, for a discussion on Hugarian judges.
70 Koninklijke KPN NV, 2016 ECLI:EU:C:2016:310 at 72.
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dations are not intended to produce binding effects, the national courts are bound
to take them into consideration for the purpose of deciding disputes submitted to
them."71 For the reasons of such a deviation, the Court stated that a national
court may only depart from the recommendation, if it is "required on grounds
related to the facts of the individual case, in particular the specific characteristics
of the market of the Member State in question." 72
This case shows how uncertain national judicial practice is regarding the legal
consequences of recommendations and other soft law norms, i.e. to what extent
deviation from a recommendation is an option. The application of the plus BU-
LRIC model is not explicitly forbidden by the recommendation, but it is subject
to certain conditions which were not met in the given case.73 The Dutch court
basically accepted that the requirement to ensure the unity of the internal market
is a principle which justifies the application of the recommendation. However, it
also pointed out that this effect on the internal market was minimal (the percent-
age of international calls was 7-9% and they were mostly made to Germany,
which operated with similar tariffs). 74
2.1.4. A Hungarian Case Study of the 2009/396/EC Recommendation
The following Hungarian case study shows another example for the work of
the same recommendation, which is followed by a hypothetical analysis in line
with the above mentioned Dutch case and with the results of the Hungarian case.
Initially, based on a BU-LRIC model, the Hungarian NRA provided the same
cost-oriented target price for all three mobile operators present on the Hungarian
market, but with a three-year phased deployment period. This meant that, at the
beginning of the regulatory cycle, the then largest operator had the lowest fees,
and the highest fees were being charged by the smallest operator, which was also
the last operator to have entered the market. These fees should have steadily
converged until they became symmetric by the third year.
In an industry where the fixed (constant) costs are high, the marginal costs are
tending towards zero, the unit cost (which, in the case of mobile termination
rates, would be the per minute cost) will necessarily be volume and traffic depen-
dent. This is the situation in the telecommunications sector and it means that in
reality each operator's cost-oriented price is different. The unit cost of an opera-
tor with a 20% market share is necessarily higher than another operator's with a
40% market share. It is impossible not to notice that convergence to symmetric
prices is a genuine possibility. However, this possibility can only occur if we
assume during an ex-ante examination that the development of the operator's
market shares tends towards equalization. So by the time the fees become sym-
71 Koninklijke KPN NV, 2016 ECLI:EU:C:2016:692 at 39-40.
72 Id. at 42.
73 See Commission Recommendation of 7 May 2009, supra note 51, at 70 (noting that the tariff
cannot exceed the average of the tariffs determined by the NRAs using the pure BU-LRIC method, a
requirement which was not fulfilled here).
74 See Heico Kerkmeester, The National Judges Position Towards Mobile Termination Rates, http://
ec.europa.eu/information society/newsroom/cf/dae/document.cfm?doc-id=8370.
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metrical, the operator's market share and turnover will be very much the same.
This was the crux of the argument against the symmetric charges by Vodafone,
the smallest Hungarian operator.
In 2006, the NRA issued its SMP decision for the second regulatory cycle,
which required the gradual introduction of prices approved by the public authori-
ties based on the BU-LRIC model. 7 5 The decision was challenged in court by all
three entities to whom it was addressed. During the judicial review of the deci-
sion, the expert opinion supported the lawfulness of the NRA's decision. The
court appointed expert explained that the trend towards market share equalization
rests on a sound theory and, therefore, the setting of converging prices on the
basis of a symmetric target price was plausible. 76 In the judgment, however, the
court emphasized its concern that the authority had set the prices for three years
even though the SMP decision was required to be reviewed and renewed every
two years.77 Consequently, the authority should not have set new lower symmet-
ric prices for the third year in its decision; this ought to have been the subject of
another decision. The court mandated the NRA to re-examine, prior to adopting
a new decision, whether its assumption was correct and whether the symmetric
prices are justified by converging market shares. The court held that the regula-
tory decision was lawful for the reason that the companies of different sizes were
obliged to use different prices converging to cost-oriented prices in the next two
years, and it was premature to examine whether the standardized cost-oriented
price would be applicable in the third year.7 8
The 2009/396/EC Recommendation applicable at that time specified a four-
year transitional period rule for the NRAs. Principally, the rates were required to
be symmetric by the 1st of January 2014.79 Recital 17 of the recommendation
states: "[i]n the mobile market it can be expected to take three to four years after
entry to reach a market share of between 15-20%, thereby approaching the level
of minimum efficient scale."80 In other words, this means that differences in
economies of scale are not relevant if the market share is above 15-20%. This
might be right, but due to the implementation of Article 13 of the Access Direc-
75 National Infocommunications Authority decision No. DH-9549-54/2006. and No. DH-664-33/
2005.
76 Fbvirosi Kdzigazgatisi 6s Munkadigyi Bfr6sig [Metropolitan Administrative and Labor Court] 17
April 2008 7.K.34.969/2006/96. (Hung.)
77 Fvirosi Kbzigazgatisi ds Munkaugyi Bfr6sig [Metropolitan Administrative and Labor Court] 17
April 2008 7.K.34.969/2006/96. (Hung.)
78 F6virosi Kdzigazgatisi 6s Munkaigyi Bfr6sig [Metropolitan Administrative and Labor Court] 17
April 2008 7.K.34.969/2006/96. (Hung.)
79 Although the wording of the recommendation is not this strict, the imposition of certain conditions
relating to deviations from the prescribed date of 1 January 2014, can be seen as binding. Commission
Recommendation (EC) No. 2009/396 of 7 May 2009, §§ 17, 22, 2009 O.J. (L 124) 67 ("[a]ny such
outcome resulting from alternative methodologies should not exceed the average of the termination rates
set by NRAs implementing the recommended cost methodology.").
80 Commission Recommendation on the Regulatory Treatment of Fixed and Mobile Termination
Rates in the EU (EC) No. 2009/396 of 7 May 2009, 2009 O.J. (L 124) 67.
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tive,8 Hungarian law implementing the Directive obliged the operator to apply a
cost-oriented price and not a price modeled on an efficient scale.
It follows from the recommendation that in the absence of a converging trend
in market shares, the unit cost of an operator with a 20% market share will be
constantly higher than that of an operator with a 40% market share. So, the price
prescribed for operators in line with the recommendation would not comply with
the newly articulated cost-orientation obligation.
2.1.5. National Law, and National Judgment Conflicting with EU Soft Law?
The Hungarian case study set out above raises a number of questions. First,
the new recommendation is not in line with the prior national court judgment,
which raises the question whether a recommendation published subsequent to a
decision of a national court can have an effect on such decision, in a manner
similar to a subsequently published binding legal norm. This question can be
also phrased as whether a new recommendation can override national law, or at
least a judgment of a national court. To answer this question, we need to con-
sider the legal nature of EU soft law.
A recommendation, which is a kind of implementing measure relating to a
hard law provision, should generally be taken into account by national law en-
forcers. Thus national law mandating the recommendation to be disregarded
must be in violation of Article 288 of the TFEU. The ECJ does not seem to
differentiate between binding and non-binding legal acts, when it asserts the pri-
macy of EU law over national law. A recommendation as an EU legal act may
override a national court judgment that is based directly on national law. Thus, a
subsequently published recommendation exhibits the same features as hard laws
do. This seems to be a strong argument for treating recommendations as binding
norms at national level.
Stefan argues8 2 that soft law is not binding on national authorities and noting
that a general obligation to enforce soft law is not mandated pursuant to the
loyalty clause of Article 4(3) of the TFEU, and Member States are also not bound
according to the case law. However, the cases cited to support this argument83
are related to informal soft law sources, namely communications (guidelines),
and the same conclusions cannot be drawn for recommendations as a formal
source of law. If an authority does not agree with a recommendation it will have
to lobby for its amendment with the Commission, but would still have to apply
such recommendation until it is amended, while in the case of a communication,
the authority may decide whether or not to apply it.
Contrary to the prevalent views in the legal literature, it could be argued that
the loyalty clause of Article 4(3) of the TFEU does create an obligation pursuant
to which Member State authorities and courts are to some extent bound by soft
81 See, e.g., Frosi K6zigazgatisi 6s Munkatigyi Bir6sig (BH) [Metropolitan Administrative and
Labor Court] Nov. 20, 2013 Vj/74/2011 (Hung.).
82 See STEFAN, supra note 1, at 175.
83 Case C-360/09, Pfleiderer AG v. Bundeskartellamt, 2011 E.C.R. 1-05161; Case C-410/09, Polska
Telefonia Cyfrowa v. Prezes Urz~du Komunikacji Elektronicznej, 2011 E.C.R. 1-03853.
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law sources of the EU, at least by recommendations as formal legal sources under
Article 288. The loyalty clause is in a lex generalis-lex specialis relationship
with the more specific provisions of the Treaty, so for example with Articles 288
and 197 of the TFEU related to the duty to respect, follow and implement the
legal sources of the EU, in other words to ensure that EU law takes full effect. In
this regard, it can be argued that recommendations as formally acknowledged by
the TFEU fall into this obligation. 84
The same, however, could not be said in relation to communications and
guidelines as they are not formal sources of EU law and have no legal basis in the
Treaties. This seems to be another major distinction between the different types
of soft law documents. It has to be noted that in relation to communications the
ECJ's practice is controversial.8 5
Even though a recommendation has the potential to prevail over a court judg-
ment reviewing a previous administrative decision, the real problem in the above
mentioned example was that the court believed that the recommendation was not
in line with the directive as regards the obligation to set cost-oriented prices. So
the question was not only whether derogation from the recommendation was pos-
sible, but rather whether the recommendation may contain binding rules that
could violate Article 13(1) of the Access Directive prescribing the cost-oriented
price obligation. In this case, a national court may only disregard the recommen-
dation if the ECJ declares it unlawful in the course of a preliminary ruling
procedure.
2.1.6. Re-establishing the Non-binding Nature of Recommendations at
National Level
The most effective solution to avoid acknowledging the binding effect of rec-
ommendations on third parties would be if the national courts themselves could
set aside the soft law norm with reference to certain legal principles. Courts are
accustomed to weighing general legal principles. If the EU Commission (which
issued the soft law) and the national regulator can deviate from the soft law norm
after giving appropriate reasons, why should judges not be able to act in the same
way?
A deviation benefiting the person regulated by the authority and also going
beyond the provisions of the soft law act is only possible if the ECJ had annulled
that soft law provision. Until then, the soft law rule is applied as a binding norm
in practice. In order not to apply them as binding norms, deviations based on
legal principles should be allowed, and to this end, national judges should have
the opportunity of referring preliminary questions about such derogations to the
ECJ.
84 Case C-350/93, Comm'n v Italy, 1995 E.C.R. 1-00699; Case C-106/89, Marleasing SA v. La
Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion SA, 1990 E.C.R. 1-04135; Case C-94/00, Roquette Frbres SA
v. Comm'n, 2002 E.C.R. 1-09011; see also MARCUS KLAMERT, THE PRINCIPLE OF LOYALTY LN EU LAW
(2014).
85 Case C-311/94, IJssel-Vliet Combinatie BV v. Minister van Economische Zaken, 1996 E.C.R. I-
05023; Case C-288/96, Germany v. Comm'n, 1999 E.C.R. 1-08237; STEFAN, supra note 1, at 176.
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2.2. Re-establishing the Non-binding Nature of Recommendations at National
Level
2.2.1. Types of EU Soft law in Competition Law
The Commission's competition directorate gives the following definition of
soft law: "the Commission has adopted various non-regulatory documents, which
may take various forms (notices, guidelines, etc). Documents such as these are
intended to explain in more detail the policy of the Commission on a number of
issues, either relating to the interpretation of substantive antitrust rules or to pro-
cedural issues, such as access to the file." 86
Most of the communications relating to competition law set out the Commis-
sion's explanation (emphasis by author) of the law. Although it is well known
that the final word rests with the EU Courts as to the correct interpretation of the
law, due to the special role the Commission plays in the European Competition
Network, its interpretation should be considered very seriously by national law
enforcers.
Beyond interpretative communications, there are other soft laws that seem to
execute hard law provisions. In the field of state aid soft law, the Commission
approved a number of different instruments (e.g. frameworks, guidelines, com-
munications, and notices) informing Member States and third parties how it in-
tends to exercise its discretion when assessing the compatibility of state aid with
the single market. Article 10 of the Regulation implementing the Treaty's state
aid provisions calls upon the Commission to publish the reference interest rates it
applies when it comes to recovering unlawful state aid.87 The Commission
adopts notices published in the C series of the Official Journal to this end.88
Formal soft law is unusual in EU competition law. Under Article 37 TFEU
the Commission may adopt recommendations to invite Member States to phase
out state monopolies of a commercial character.8 9 However, it was back in 1988
that the EU Commission last resorted to this instrument to introduce competition
in various petroleum product markets in Portugal.90 In state aid law there is a
recommendation defining macro, small and medium-sized enterprises which can
have important legal consequences for the authorization of a planned aid mea-
86 Antitrust Legislation, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/legislation/
legislation.html.
87 Commission Regulation (EC) No 794/2004 of 21 April 2004 implementing Council Regulation
(EC)No 659/1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty OJ L 140,
30.4.2004, 1-134.
88 See Commission Notice on Current State Aid Recovery Interest Rates and Reference/Discount
Rates for 27 Member States Applicable as from 1 April 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 85) 11, 11 (EC).
89 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union OJ C 326,
26.10.2012, 110.
90 Commission Recommendation of 22 December 1987 to the Portuguese Republic Concerning the
Adjustment of the State Monopoly of a Commercial Character in Petroleum Products vis-A-vis the Other
Member States, 1988 O.J. (L 56) 30, 32 (EC).
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sure.9 1 Article 1 of the recommendation "invites" Member States to comply with
the provisions of the recommendation. 9 2 Who could resist such a friendly invita-
tion? Hungary complied with the adoption of a law on small and medium-sized
enterprises in 2004. The closing provisions recall that the legislation was meant
to comply with the Commission's recommendation, just as if it was a directive.93
This is a good example of how EU soft law can become binding for national
courts through transformation into national hard law.
2.2.2. The Subject Matter and Wording of Communications
The form and the legal title of hard law instruments help to identify their
position in the legal hierarchy of laws. It is hard to tell whether the same would
be true for soft laws. In Grimaldi v. Fonds des Maladies Professionnelles, the
Court stressed that the choice of form cannot alter the nature of a measure. It
must be ascertained whether the content of a measure is wholly consistent with
the form attributed to it.94 We would argue that it is not the form, but rather the
content that is relevant. Yet, the way the Commission's communication on the
interpretation of Article 102 TFEU was published, may suggest that titles and
headings can also be of relevance. The final version of the guidelines (the result
of years of debating among stakeholders) was labeled as 'guidance,' allegedly
explaining only the 'enforcement priorities' of the EU Commission. 95 However,
a careful reading reveals that the text provides a cautious new, 'more economic'
interpretation of the Treaty's prohibition of exclusionary abuses. The reason for
this was that the Commission wanted to avoid the charge of re-writing old but
well established case law focusing on the protection of market structures.
The wording of a communication reflects its binding nature, or the lack
thereof. The right to rely on the principle of the protection of legitimate expecta-
tions applies to any individual in a situation in which it is clear that the EU, by
giving him precise assurances, has caused him to entertain legitimate expecta-
tions.96 So the precise wording of a communication is of high importance.
As an example, point 76 of the guidelines on regional aid expressly declares
that operating aid is generally not allowed in the EU. 9 7 This seems to be a soft
rule because of the phrase 'generally,' yet the following provisions make this
sentence harder when exceptional circumstances in which operating aid can nev-
ertheless be exempted from the prohibition are expressly enumerated. The more
91 Commission Recommendation of 6 May 2003 Concerning the Definition of Micro, Small and
Medium-Sized Enterprises, 2003 O.J. (L 124) 36 (EC).
92 Id. at Art. 1.
93 2004. Ovi XXXIV. torv6ny a kis- 6s kz6pvAllalkozdsokr6l, fejl'd6stik timogatAsbr61 (Act XXXIV
of 2003 on the small and medium-sized enterprises) (Hung.) §20.
94 Case C-322/88, Grimaldi v. Fonds des maladies professionelles, 1989 E.C.R. 4407, ¶ 14 (citing
Case 147/83, Binderer v. Comm'n, 1985 E.C.R. 257).
95 Communication from the Commission - Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in
applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings (Text
with EEA relevance) OJ C 45, 24.2.2009, 7-20.
96 Case T-273/01, Innova Privat-Akademie GmbH v. Comm'n, 2003 E.C.R. 11-01093, ¶ 26.
97 Guidelines on regional State aid for 2014-2020. OJ C209, 23.07.2013.
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detailed the provisions of a communication, the harder its legal nature will
become.
The Commission successfully managed the state aid part of the financial and
economic crisis by issuing soft law instruments. This soft regulation allowed a
flexible way of regulation at a time when economic conditions were changing
dramatically. One of the provisions of the temporary framework adopted in De-
cember 2008 declared that the Commission would consider state aid that ex-
ceeded the threshold indicated in the de minimis regulation compatible with the
common market on the basis of Article 87(3)(b) of the Treaty, provided that all
of the conditions listed are met (e.g. that the aid would not exceed 500,000 C and
that it would be granted in a scheme).9 8 This could be seen as a kind of extension
to the existing de minimis regulation declaring that aid under 200,000 E would
not fall under Article 107(1) TFEU. It is true that the legal consequences of a de
minimis exception and an exemption from the notification obligation are not ex-
actly the same, yet in practice the difference is not that significant.
In EU competition law, there are three soft law instruments that are expressly
addressed to judges of Member States' courts. There are two co-operation no-
tices, one for antitrust, and another one for state aid matters. 99
The co-operation notice laying down the principles for in the effective func-
tioning of the European Competition Network enjoys a special status among soft
laws.10 0 The annex includes a statement signed by competition authorities ac-
knowledging that they will "abide by the principles" of the notice, with special
regard to the handling of leniency applications. This could give way to claims
even during subsequent court procedures arguing that a national competition au-
thority did not obey the principles of the notice.101
The communication targeting national judges is a unique instrument giving
guidance to national courts about the quantification of harm caused by infringe-
ments of EU antitrust rules. In the communication, the Commission recalls the
main existing principles that may help courts and parties deal with this issue,
such as the requirement that national rules on quantification should not make it
excessively difficult to obtain compensation for the harm suffered. 102 The Com-
mission's short communication is accompanied by a comprehensive Practical
Guide drawn up by the Commission's services. The Guide provides an overview
of the main methods and techniques available to quantify such harm in practice.
98 Communication from the Commission of Jan. 1, 2009, Temporary Community Framework for
State Aid Measures to Support Access to Finance in the Current Financial and Economic Crisis, 2009
O.J. (C 16) 1, 5 (EC).
99 Commission Notice of Apr. 9, 2009, on the Enforcement of State Aid Law by National Courts,
2009 O.J. (C 85) 1 (EC).
100 Commission Notice of Apr. 27, 2004, on Cooperation Within the Network of Competition Author-
ities, 2004 O.J. (C 101) 43 (EC).
101 National Authorities which have Signed the Statement Regarding the Commission Notice on Co-
operation within the Network of Competition Authorities, EUROPA.EU, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/
antitrust/legislation/list of authorities joint-statement.pdf.
102 Communication from the Commission on quantifying harm in actions for damages based on
breaches of Article 101 or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 2013 O.J. (C
167, 19).
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The strength of these soft law instruments and its soft binding effect is weak-
ened by the fact that the Commission might not be the best placed body to have
perfect knowledge in this field. Neither does the Commission's competence
cover awarding damages, nor has it developed a practice to investigate and quan-
tify the harm caused by cartels or other anti-competitive practices as a method to
impose fines on undertakings.
In contrast, communications covering subject matters where the Commission
itself enforces EU law are more persuasive and may use stronger language. This
is the case for the leniency, the settlement and the fining guidelines. 103 To put it
differently, hard provisions like these limit the discretionary powers of the Com-
mission, thereby creating rights for individuals. In our study we do not focus on
these soft law instruments, because they cannot be considered in the context of
national court procedures, rather they are applicable exclusively within the
framework of Commission procedures.
Those communications which can be applied not only by the EU Commission,
but also by national competition authorities tend to have more cautious wording.
The Commission provides orientation, but does not bind the hands of other insti-
tutions applying EU law. The one exception to this is co-operation notice in
which competition authorities were expressly invited to make a declaration that
they will abide by its provisions. This is how the Commission can influence law
enforcement within the ECN without enjoying hierarchical control powers. To
conclude, national courts and, in most cases, national competition authorities are
not bound by communications issued by the Commission, which set out its inter-
pretation of substantive antitrust rules. These communications cannot therefore
give rise to rights which ought to be protected by national judges.
On the other hand, if a national competition authority takes EU communica-
tions seriously by including extensive references to them in its reasoning, the
content of these instruments could become subject to litigation before review
courts. In an extreme case, one could argue that there would be good grounds for
a party challenging national competition authority decision whereupon a non-
application of a Commission communication results in a divergent outcome for
such party. If a national competition authority comes to be seen as generally
adhering to EU guidelines as if they were sources of hard law, a general legiti-
mate expectation as to the automatic application of EU soft law could arise
among legal and business stakeholders. 10 4
103 Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation No 1/
2003. Official Journal C 210, 1.09.2006, 2-5. Commission notice on immunity from fines and reduction
of fines in cartel cases, Official Journal C 144, 23.04.2016, 23-28. Commission notice on the conduct of
settlement procedures, Official Journal C 167, 2.7.2008, 1-6.
104 This argument has not been tested in Hungary yet, since as a rule, the Competition Council follows
the Commission's communications.
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2.2.3. EU Communications Applied by the Competition Council of the
Hungarian Competition Authority (GVH)
The overall attitude of the Hungarian Competition Authority, GVH, has al-
ways been EU-friendly; the Competition Council had based its decisions on the
principles derived from the case law of the EU courts and the soft law documents
issued by the EU Commission, even before the country joined the EU. Diverging
interpretations of EU and Hungarian competition norms only arose in exceptional
circumstances, and were generally attributable to human factors as opposed to
conscious resistance.10 5
An overview of the Competition Council's decisions since 2009 shows that the
most often cited EU communication is the guidelines interpreting the effect on
trade clause of Articles 101 or 102 TFEU.10 6 The Competition Council quoted
not only those parts of the notice which reproduced the case law of the EU Court,
but also the numerical formulas elaborated by the Commission (i.e. the 5% mar-
ket share and the 40 million Euro turnover threshold) have been followed as law.
Virnay and T6th conclude that this proves that the GVH was prepared to bring
its practice in line not only with hard EU laws, but also with the policies of the
EU Commission expressed in the form of various soft law documents. 0 7 The
notices on vertical restrictions,1 0 8 on horizontal anti-competitive agreements,1 09
the de minimis anti-competitive agreements"o and the definition of the relevant
market"' are also among the soft laws most often mentioned. A seminal case
where the Competition Council based its reasoning on a soft law document is-
sued by the EU Commission involved the evaluation of a non-compete clause.' 12
The GVH imposed fines on a French-owned Hungarian newspaper distributor
company and several other newspaper publishers in 2010. The infringement in-
volved a special market allocation arrangement involving a non-compete clause
attached to the privatization of the newspaper distribution business of the Hun-
garian Post back in 1998. The reasoning relied heavily on the communication on
ancillary restraints of March 2005,13 setting out conditions under which the
105 See Tiham6r T6th, The Reception and Application of EU Competition Rules: An Organic Evolu-
tion, THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION IN HUNGARY: INSTrrUTIONS, PROCESSES & THE LAW 247, 251-
52 (Mdrton VaIju & Em6; Virnay eds. 2014).
106 Commission Notice of Apr. 27, 2004, Guidelines on the Effect on Trade Concept Contained in
Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, 2004 O.J. (C 101) 81 (EC).
107 See Vimay & T6th, supra note 8, at 23.
108 See, e.g., F6vdrosi ft6lfibla (BH) [Metropolitan Court of Appeal] Sept. 19, 2012, Vj-57/2007
(Hung.).
109 See, e.g., Kdzigazgatisi 6s Munkatigyi Bfr6signak (BH) [Administrative and Labor Court] Nov.
20, 2013, Vj/74/2011 (Hung.).
110 See, e.g., id.
111 See, e.g., Kbzigazgatdsi 6s Munkailgyi Bfr6sdgnak (BH) [Administrative and Labor Court] Dec.
12, 2014, Vj/98/2011 (Hung.).
112 See, e.g., F6virosi ft6lfdbla (BH) [Budapest Court of Appeal] Nov. 4, 2012, Vj-195/2007/151
(Hung.).
113 Commission Notice of Mar. 5, 2005 on Restrictions Directly Related and Necessary to Concentra-
tions, 2005 O.J. (C 56) 24, 24-31.
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Commission will evaluate a non-compete provision as a natural attribute to an
authorized concentration, instead of finding that there was cartel-like behavior.
The Competition Council ruled that since the conditions contained therein were
not met, the agreement was a naked cartel apt to be sanctioned under EU and
Hungarian law.' 1 4
The soft law document relating to the interpretation of Article 102 TFEU re-
garding exclusionary abusive practices raises special problems.' 1 5 The publica-
tion of the document had been preceded by years of discussions involving all the
stakeholders. However, the more economic approach reflected in the document
was regarded as a new development in view of the more ordoliberal approach of
the EU courts in protecting the structure of the competitive process. In order to
minimize the potential conflict, the document was published with an unusual
title: Guidance on the EU Commission's enforcement priorities in applying Arti-
cle 102 TFEU to exclusionary abusive conduct ("the Guidance").' 16 Despite its
modest heading, the Guidance was much more than a listing of priorities, it pro-
vided a detailed explanation of how the Commission intends to interpret Article
102 TFEU for cases commenced after the date of its publication.
The Commission adopted its famous decision in the Intel v. Comm'n case" 7
imposing record breaking fines shortly after it had published the Guidance. The
reasoning of the decision was hybrid, relying on both established case law and an
analysis of the facts of the case in light of the Guidance. The General Court
avoided any reference to the Guidance in its judgment, quoting exclusively from
previous judgments when describing the requirements of EU law regarding the
rebate systems and more generally, the need to prove actual abusive effects. The
General Court refused to analyze whether the contested decision was in line with
the Guidance." 8 It was argued firstly, that the Guidance was applicable only for
cases commenced following its publication, and secondly, that the Guidance set
out enforcement priorities which could not have been applied in a procedure
where the Commission had already decided that it would initiate an investigation
as a matter of priority.119 In the same vein, Advocate General Kokott refused to
follow the Commission's more economic approach in British Airways v.
114 Commission Notice of Mar. 5, 2005, supra note 113, at 115.
115 Communication from the Commission - Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in
applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings (Text
with EEA relevance) OJ C 45, 24.2.2009, 7-20.
116 Communication from the Commission of Feb. 24, 2009, Guidance on the Commission's Enforce-
ment Priorities in Applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant
Undertakings (EC) 2009 O.J. (C 45) 7; see also Press Release IP/08/1877, European Commission, The
Antitrust: Consumer Welfare at Heart of Commission Fight Against Abuses by Dominant Undertakings
(Dec. 3, 2008).
17 Case T-286/09, Intel v. Comm'n, 2014 EU:T:2014:547 (currently on appeal, the case is pending
judgment on a procedural question under Article 82 of the EC Treaty and Article 54 of the EEA Agree-
ment (COMP/C-3/37.990)).
118 Intel v. Comm'n, 2014 EU:T:2014:547 ¶J[ 156-157.
119 Id.
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Comm'n1 2 0 and relied on the Court's traditional interpretation of Article 102
TFEU.
This is in sharp contrast with the Competition Council's approach taken in its
most recent MasterCard decision imposing fines for exclusionary practices in the
Hungarian debit card market. The decision making body of the competition au-
thority quoted the Guidance several times as if it was the statement of the law as
regards the correct interpretation of Article 102 TFEU. 121
2.2.4. The Attitude of Hungarian Judges
A review of recently published court judgments shows that administrative
courts have had no problem with the application of EU competition law commu-
nications so far. It seems that parties have accepted them as a useful framework
for the legal evaluation of the cases at hand. For example, the Municipal Court's
judgment in the above mentioned newspaper distribution cartel case mentions the
Commission's ancillary restraint notice several times, despite stating that it was
not of relevance for deciding the case. 1 2 2 This is interesting if we consider that
the GVH's decision did include references to the ancillary restraints notice. One
reason for this could be that the notice was issued in 2005, whereas the facts of
the case dated back several years.1 23 The appellate review court did not even
mention the EU communication in its judgment upholding the decision of the
Municipal Court. 124
We would expect that cases decided based on the communication on exclu-
sionary abuses1 25 would be subject to some debate. This soft law sought to sum-
marize the law on exclusionary abuses in the light of the mainstream, more
economic approach which is not always reflected in the Court's jurisprudence.
An interesting case could develop from the most recent Competition Council
decision finding an infringement by MasterCard in relation to the setting of its
multilateral interchange fees. 126 This is a negative decision imposing HUF 80
million in fines, so a court review, involving legal arguments challenging the
Council's reliance on the communication, is to be expected. In addition to men-
tioning the communications on the effect on trade between Member States and
the definition of the relevant market, the MasterCard decision includes more than
thirty references to the Commission's priority guidance. 127 As a matter of fact,
the Council quotes this as the "Dominance Communication," disregarding the
special nature of this soft law instrument, which is also reflected in its title. The
whole legal analysis of the Council is based on this soft law instrument, with
120 Case C-95/04 P, British Airways v. Comm'n, 2007 E.C.R. 1-2377, 2383-86.
121 Vj/46/2012, decision of January 11, 2016.
122 Fivirosi ft6lfibla (BH) [Metropolitan Court of Appeal] Sept. 19, 2012, Vj-57/2007 (Hung.).
123 Commission Notice of Mar. 5, 2005, supra note 113, at 15.
124 Id.
125 Communication from the Commission of Fed. 24, 2009, supra note 80, at 7-20.
126 Kdzigazgatgsi ds Munkaugyi Bfr6signak (BH) [Administrative and Labor Court] Jan. 11, 2016,
Vj/46/2012 (Hung.).
127 Vj/46/2012, decision of January 11, 2016.
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some additional references to the case law of the EU courts, 12 8 including opin-
ions of advocate generals, although previous GVH decisions are not even men-
tioned. This is perhaps the best example to show that national quasi-judicial
bodies, like the Competition Council of the GVH, take EU soft law as seriously
as the case law of the European courts or other hard law sources.
In theory, even if a national competition authority follows these communica-
tions, it seems that national courts can simply disregard them without an obliga-
tion to turn to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling. This could be a difference
between formal soft law acts, like a recommendation, and other types of soft law
that are formally not mentioned in the Treaties. In practice, however, the legality
of EU competition law communications have not been challenged by parties
before Hungarian courts yet. As a rule, administrative judges are accustomed to
conducting a review of competition law cases, largely deferring to the position of
the competition authority.1 29 An administrative decision based on EU or national
soft law used to reinforce applicable margins of discretion, would only be held
unlawful if the conclusions were unlawful, unreasonable or logically wrong. So
the authority always possesses a degree of discretion that is not capable of judi-
cial review procedures.
Due to this weak judicial control, soft law that has only soft binding force at
the level of a given authority hardens at court level, as it usually falls outside the
scope of judicial control, unless there is a relevant violation of a hard law provi-
sion. In the post-Menarini world' 3 0 this may gradually change to meet the expec-
tations of the European Court of Human Rights. Still, administrative judges may
feel more comfortable agreeing with the -reasoning given by an expert or an inde-
pendent competition authority in cases raising complex economic and policy is-
sues. What makes a national judge more equipped than the highly competent EU
Commission to determine what an exclusionary abuse is, or when trade between
Member States is significantly affected?
The process of the hardening of EU soft law cannot be observed in civil law
litigation where the plaintiff is seeking compensation for damages caused by
anti-competitive conduct. Hungarian civil law courts deciding damages or con-
tractual claims rarely, if ever, apply EU competition rules. If they cannot avoid
making reference to competition rules, then they would rely on domestic ones.
Since EU competition rules are not routinely enforced by civil law judges, we
cannot evaluate their approach to EU soft law either.
128 See, e.g., Case C-23/14, Post Danmark A/S v. Konkurrenceridet, 2015 E.C.R. 651 (EC); Case C-
382/12, MasterCard v. Comm'n, 2014 E.C.R. 2201 (EC).
129 Maciej Barnatt, Transatlantic Perspective on Judicial Deference in Administrative Law, 22
CotuM. J. EUR. L. 275 (2016) (providing excellent comparison of judicial deference in administrative
law, including competition law).
130 A. Menarini Diagnostics S.R.L. v. Italy, App. No. 43509/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011), http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=002-385.
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3. Conclusions
In Grimaldi v. Fonds des Maladies Professionnelles, the Court acknowledged
that recommendations can have legal effects. 1 3 1 The national courts are bound to
take recommendations into consideration in order to decide disputes submitted to
them. This is the case especially (i) where they help interpret national measures
adopted in order to implement EU soft law or (ii) where they are designed to
supplement binding Community provisions. This is because, unlike Article 263
of the TFEU, which excludes review by the Court of acts like recommendations,
Article 267 confers on the Court jurisdiction to give a preliminary ruling on the
validity and interpretation of all acts of the institutions of the Community with-
out exception. However, we should bear in mind that in the context of the
Court's ruling "bound to consider a recommendation" does not mean that soft
law should be enforced in the same way as hard law.
The obligation to consider does not include an absolute obligation of adher-
ence, nevertheless, in practice; national judges tend to defer to the EU Commis-
sion's interpretation of EU law published in soft law form. This is due to three
reasons. First, traditional administrative judicial control does not make deviation
from the Commission's position an easy option. Second, national judges often
lack expertise in technical fields of EU law. Lastly, interpretation of EU law may
require policy decisions to be made, which does not naturally fit judges.
Despite these difficulties we submit that Grimaldi's "bound to take into con-
sideration" language should not prohibit a national judge from departing from
Commission soft laws. However, a clear explanation should be put forward, con-
sidering any potential conflict with legal principles like the protection of legiti-
mate expectations.
Nonetheless, under the traditional model of administrative judicial review, this
is currently not the case, especially not in the telecommunications sector. As we
have shown, based on the soft binding effect of soft law, only national regulators
are able to deviate from EU soft law documents, but not national courts. If the
authority deviates from the soft law, then, if such deviation resulted in an unlaw-
ful, unreasonable, or logically wrongful use of discretion, the court may override
this decision based on the principle of legitimate expectations. However, unless
a clear violation of legality is presented, a court may not override the position
taken by the national authority simply because the authority's decision is con-
trary on EU soft law. If the authority applied the soft law document, then the
principle of legitimate expectations dictates that the courts should not challenge
EU soft law indirectly, through quashing the national administrative decision. A
rare exception might be when the EU soft law is in violation of an EU hard law
provision, but then it would be the ECJ's task to decide on the validity of the soft
law act in the form of a preliminary ruling.
It is also likely that the national court's attitude may be different depending
upon the nature of the legal field involved, as well as the competence and the
expertise of the Commission. In Grimaldi v. Fonds des Maladies Professionnel-
131 Case C-322/88, Grimaldi v. Fonds des maladies professionnelles, 1989 E.C.R. 4407.
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les, the measures in question were "true recommendations," that is to say mea-
sures which, even as regards the persons they addressed, were not intended to
produce binding effects. 1 32 This was because they related to social policy, be-
longing to the realm of Member State sovereignty. There was neither clear EU
competence, nor Commission expertise gained through law enforcement. On the
other hand, the EU Commission can be regarded as an experienced enforcer of
competition rules in the EU. Why would a judge believe that he or she knows
better, especially if the soft law instrument had been discussed with national
competition authorities, and they reflect a complex, coherent interpretation of
vaguely worded provisions of EU hard law?
We agree with the conclusion drawn by Stefan that "soft law is seen by the
European Courts as a particular type of norm, complementary to (hard) laws and
part of the broader normative framework they consider when judging cases sub-
mitted to their jurisdiction." 3 3 Interpretative communications may have legal
consequences even if they lack general binding force. Depending upon the cir-
cumstances, they may limit not only the discretionary powers of the Commission,
but also national competition authorities, especially if the latter establish a prac-
tice of following EU communications as if they were law. Administrative courts,
in turn, should protect legitimate expectations and check whether national author-
ities have adhered to those EU soft law instruments that were meant to generate
legitimate expectations.
Beyond the general principles of EU law, the naturally limited depth of admin-
istrative judicial review, and the division of the executive branch and the judici-
ary, there is another driving force making national judges welcoming of, or at
least tolerant towards, the application of EU soft law. Most national competition
agencies, just like the GVH, also issue such communications under national law.
If their content and wording gives rise to the protection of legitimate expecta-
tions, then courts will get accustomed to acknowledging the legal value of these
national communications. In a system of parallel application of EU and national
competition laws it is highly unlikely that the courts would differentiate between
cases involving questions relating to adherence to an EU or a national communi-
cation. This is even truer in cases where national authorities enforce both EU
and domestic competition rules. This evolving practice under domestic law also
contributes to the 'hardening' of EU soft laws.
So where lies the difference between soft law and hard law from the perspec-
tive of a national judge? First, even though their binding effect is not absolute, if
the authority relies on EU soft law in its decision then deviation at the level of the
courts is only a rare option. Second, soft law should not create new obligations
for undertakings subject to substantive EU rules.134 Similarly, the legal principle
prohibiting the introduction of stricter new rules with retrospective effect on third
132 Case C-322/88, Grimaldi v. Fonds des maladies professionnelles, 1989 E.C.R. 4407.
133 Oana A. Stefan, European Competition Soft Law in European Courts: A Matter of Hard Princi-
ples?, 14 EUR. L. J. 753, 767 (2008).
134 See e.g., Commission Directive 2006/111 of 16 November 2006 on the Transparency of Financial
Relations Between Member States and Public Undertakings as well as on Financial Transparency Within
Certain Undertakings, 2006 O.J. (L 318) 17.
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parties is not applicable to soft law instruments. Nevertheless, the effect of some
EU competition law communications with potentially hard provisions is re-
stricted to new cases, i.e. where the Commission has not issued a statement of
objections yet.
The possibility for deviation by authorities and the legal review of such arbi-
trary deviation from a soft law instrument is perhaps the most significant differ-
ence of soft law when compared to hard law norms. The option not to follow the
soft law in exceptional circumstances softens their binding effect. The authority,
and under even stricter conditions, the review court can decide not to follow the
soft law instrument. For the telecommunications sector a special procedure is
foreseen with the Commission enjoying veto powers over the decision of a na-
tional regulator. For competition law, law enforcers are expected to explain why
their different approach does not contravene general principles of EU law (e.g.
legal certainty and the protection of legitimate expectations). Co-operation be-
tween the EU Commission and national competition authorities applying EU law
makes deviation from EU soft law fairly unlikely, even if a deviation benefiting
individuals would not endanger the applicability of legal principles.
Our paper endeavored to prove that, despite the Treaty's and the ECJ's state-
ment that they are non-binding norms, soft laws are often considered by national
courts the same way as hard laws. Within soft law, a distinction can be made
between formal acts like a recommendation and informal soft laws like a commu-
nication. If courts would find that a recommendation is in conflict with EU hard
law since it creates a new obligation, they should refer the act to the ECJ for a
preliminary ruling, to get a ruling on its validity. However, the Dutch telecom-
munications example showed that there is a fine line between genuine soft law
content and the creation of new obligations, thus it would be reasonable if the
ECJ could also be asked to interpret the content of soft law documents as well.
On the other hand, interpretative competition law communications - within the
above mentioned limits of judicial review - can simply be disregarded were the
judges disagree with their content. We do not believe that this distinction be-
tween two different types of soft laws is warranted. Even if recommendations are
expressly mentioned in the founding treaties, their legal effects should not be
different from that of informal soft laws.
Such a hardening of soft law at national level creates the same conflicts be-
tween the Commission and national courts as the ones that exist between the
Commission and the European Parliament or the Council at EU level.' 35 In order
to make legal control of soft laws issued by the Commission a reality, the prelim-
inary ruling procedure should be made more effective. A way to achieve this
would be if the ECJ, based on Articles 263 and 288 of the TFEU, would allow
preliminary questions of interpretations for recommendations and for other soft
law documents, thus it would encourage referrals for the annulment of norms
binding third parties. Otherwise the legal effects of soft law will continue to
differ at EU and national levels.
135 See Resolution 2007/2028, of the European Parliament of 4 September 2007 on Institutional and
Legal Implications of the Use of "Soft Law" Instruments, 2007/2028 (INI).
30 Loyola University Chicago International Law Review Volume 14, Issue I
